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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For many people, law is simply law:  a set of rules that a given 
society creates, by whatever process, for itself and its members to live 
by.1  It is a tool, an instrument, a set of institutions, a system for 
achieving social goals.2  Perhaps because law pervades daily life and 
structures routine encounters, even those who live and work within a 
legal system may only rarely consider larger questions regarding the 
nature of law.  It is easy to be satisfied with a view of law as statutes and 
cases, lawyers and courts, police and prisons.  Despite the prevalence of 
this straightforward view, it is evident that there are deeper complexities, 
even contradictions, in the law—in its structures, objectives, practices, 
and participants.  These have increasingly been recognized and 
interrogated by social and legal theorists, most frequently in the context 
of a single nation-state or government.  However, those complexities 
may be even more prominent, and significant, in the international realm.  
International law appears to lack many of the familiar institutions of 
domestic law, and the question is often raised whether international law 
is really law at all.3  An understanding of law as more than an instrument 
or particular system offers more productive means of considering that 
question. 
Drawing upon diverse scholars of law from various disciplines, this 
article traces three central themes that emerge to theorize law as multi-
dimensional:  law as violence, law as bureaucracy, and law as 
governance.4  Understanding violence as a dimension of law moves 
 
 1. See Patricia M. Wald, Violence Under the Law: A Judge’s Perspective, in LAW’S 
VIOLENCE 77, 77-104 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995). 
 2. See Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge:  Culture in the 
Iron Cage, 108 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 52, 52-65 (2006).  See generally, MAX WEBER, 
Economy and Law (Sociology of Law), in ECONOMY AND SOCIETY:  AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIOLOGY 641, 641-900 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). 
 3. ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:  HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE 
OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (2003). 
 4. These themes emerge dominantly in the work of Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Max 
Weber, and Michel Foucault, respectively.  For a discussion of law-making and law-preserving 
violence, see WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS 277, 277-300 (Peter 
Demetz ed., Schocken Books Inc. 1986) (1921); Jacques Derrida, Force de Loi:  Le “Fondement 
Mystique de L’autorité” [Force of Law:  The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”], 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 919, 919-1045 (1989-1990).  For an elaboration of the role of bureaucracy in law, see MAX 
WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:  SELECTIONS IN 
TRANSLATION 341, 341-54 (W.G. Runciman ed., E. Matthews trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1978) 
(1922); Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 264, 264-73 (Craig 
Calhoun et al. eds., Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2d Ed. 2007) (1922); see also STEPHEN P. TURNER & 
REGIS A. FACTOR, MAX WEBER:  THE LAWYER AS SOCIAL THINKER (1994).  For an examination of 
the rise of governance in relation to law, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, Governmentality, in THE 
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beyond traditional views of law as an alternative to and bulwark against 
violence (particularly the violence of individual offenders).  Instead, 
“law as violence” foregrounds the originating and sustaining force that 
underlies the creation and maintenance of law (and the state) as well as 
law’s deliberate use of violence.5  Bureaucracy as a dimension of law—
“law as bureaucracy”—focuses on the rationalization of law and its 
processes, and the ways in which it works through the expertise of 
individuals and institutions.6  Finally, “law as governance” recognizes 
the diffusion of law into a wider range of projects of reform and 
management both within and outside of the formal mechanisms of the 
law and the state.7  These are neither necessarily alternative nor 
exhaustive views of law, but rather reflect significant and often 
overlapping features of law and legality. 
International law well-illustrates this more nuanced understanding 
of law.  This article will consider humanitarian interventions conducted 
in the name of human rights and the ‘rule of law’ to illuminate the multi-
dimensional nature of law as violence, bureaucracy, and governance.  
Typically in humanitarian intervention, a group of nations (often under 
the aegis of an inter-governmental organization such as the United 
Nations) uses force or the threat of force against another nation in the 
interest of protecting that nation’s citizens based upon a judgment that 
the nation is either unwilling or unable to do so itself.8  This is law’s 
violence—serving both to counter and constrain violence considered 
outside the law as well as to create and maintain a new legal order.  
Once the international presence has established itself by threat or force, 
it begins to (re)build the nation through an on-going presence or field 
mission.  This is law’s bureaucracy, which imports both a new legal 
system and a range of experts to administer it.  The end goal of such an 
intervention is to establish a process of governance of the local 
 
ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT:  SELECTIONS FROM ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954-1984, at 229-45 
(Paul Rabinow & Nikolas Rose eds., 1994); ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW:  
TOWARDS A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE 99 (1994). 
 5. For a discussion of law-making and law-preserving violence, see BENJAMIN, supra note 4, 
at 277-300; Derrida, supra note 4, at 919-1045. 
 6. For an elaboration of the role of bureaucracy in law, see WEBER, The Development of 
Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:  SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4, 
at 341-354; Weber, Bureaucracy, in CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 4, at 264-73; 
see also TURNER & FACTOR, supra note 4. 
 7. For an examination of the rise of governance in relation to law, see FOUCAULT, supra note 
4, at 229-245; HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 4. 
 8.  See PATRICIA MARCHAK, NO EASY FIX:  GLOBAL RESPONSES TO INTERNAL WARS AND 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 6 (2008); HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE 
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 268-70 (2000). 
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population—law as governance—first by international administrators 
and increasingly in conjunction with a range of ‘civil society’ 
organizations, until the nation has been determined to be capable again 
of self-governance. 
Recent years have seen such interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and elsewhere.9  In the field, 
international policymakers and advocates typically adopt an approach 
that attempts to blend pragmatism with idealism.10  Law appears in its 
familiar guise as a tool to be wielded in the interests of the greater good.  
While this may reflect intentions (if not always reality), it seldom allows 
for a more critical or nuanced view.  Instead, it leads to an understanding 
of intervention based on human rights or humanitarian grounds as, at 
best, an attempt to (re)establish the “rule of law” and to (re)build the 
nation, and at worst, as a well-intentioned choice to avoid the greater 
evil of “doing nothing” in response to crisis.11  But there remain more 
fundamental questions to examine.  What is the “rule of law” in such a 
context?  What does it mean to establish law (and human rights) through 
forceful intervention?  How is law deployed in international projects of 
governance?  As this article elaborates a theory of law’s multi-
dimensional nature, it will engage with these questions in the context of 
international interventions. 
In Part II, this article will explore law’s relationship with violence.  
It will briefly examine conventional views that position law as a restraint 
upon or selective and judicious dispenser of violence as well as more 
critical views that explore the enmeshed nature of law and violence.  It 
will then discuss contemporary humanitarian interventions and human 
rights institutions and practices, and their historical antecedents, to 
surface international law’s violence.  In Part III, this article will discuss 
the ways in which law’s force becomes subject to bureaucratic, technical 
considerations with the increasing rationalization of law.  In the context 
of international interventions, it will elaborate the importation of 
“rational” international legal regimes and the deployment of “objective” 
international experts to establish and manage such regimes and to train 
local participants in these new procedures and practices.  Part IV will 
 
 9.  HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OPERATIONS, LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE (Michael O’Flaherty 
ed., 2007); MARCHAK, supra note 8; SHERENE H. RAZACK, DARK THREATS AND WHITE KNIGHTS:  
THE SOMALIA AFFAIR, PEACEKEEPING, AND THE NEW IMPERIALISM (2004). 
 10. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE:  REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (2004); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS:  ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). 
 11. RAZACK, supra note 9, at 150. 
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focus on the deployment of law as a technique in projects of governance 
and the roles of experts in creating, facilitating, and maintaining 
networks and practices of reform and management.  Humanitarian 
interventions begin as the projects of states and inter-governmental 
organizations but expand to include larger and more diffuse networks of 
actors.  The article will conclude by returning to the larger questions of 
international law and contending that understanding the integration of 
law’s violence with projects and institutions of bureaucracy and 
governance is essential for answering those questions as well as for an 
appropriately complex appraisal of humanitarian intervention in the 
contemporary environment. 
II.  THE FORCE OF LAW:  LAW AS VIOLENCE IN HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
It may be easiest to imagine the connections between law and 
violence in the context of criminal law with its fierce debates about the 
scope and purposes of punishment, including the ultimate measure of the 
death penalty, or the treatment of prisoners and the conditions of their 
incarceration.12  However, the relationship of law and violence is more 
encompassing, more complex, and more contested.  Conventional views 
position law in opposition to violence, as a restraint upon violence, or, at 
most, as a deliberate and impartial dispenser of violence.  In many 
circumstances, for many participants in legal processes and institutions, 
those views are accurate and adequate.  Nonetheless, there are important 
critical voices that challenge these understandings, both to problematize 
more benevolent views and to articulate the complicated ways in which 
law and violence are enmeshed.  This section will consider both 
conventional and critical views of law and violence before examining 
their relationship in the context of international law and humanitarian 
intervention. 
A. Law as a Civilizer of Violence 
Under the conventional view, law and violence are connected, but 
law domesticates, channels, and justifies violence.  Not all violence is 
equal; there is a fundamental distinction between violence used for just 
 
 12. See ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW:  
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203, 203-38 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, & Austin Sarat eds., 
1992) (using the criminal trial and death penalty as examples); Wald, supra note 1, at 77-104 
(discussing the criminal trial); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:  THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON (1975) (tracing the origins of punishment and the emergence of prisons). 
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(or legal) purposes and violence used for unjust (or illegal) purposes.  
Violence authorized by law is just(ified), and violence outside the law is 
not.13  Legal theorist Robert Cover articulates this understanding of law 
as an alternative to and a means to control violence:  “Were the 
inhibition against violence perfect, law would be unnecessary; were it 
not capable of being overcome through social signals, law would not be 
possible.”14  Here, law represents the best intentions:  it “is the 
projection of an imagined future upon reality.”15 
Judges and lawyers, though not its only agents, are often the most 
visible faces of the law, particularly in this model.  The traditional, 
idealized view of judges (and sometimes lawyers) focuses on esteemed 
qualities of intelligence and ethics, but also on an objectivity and “ability 
to step away from the battles of the day and to articulate the principles of 
a rational and orderly society.”16  They seem to be the antithesis of 
violence, and yet judges also wield violence through their ability to 
command the enforcement of the law.17  If, as former federal court judge 
Patricia Wald suggests, “a society is defined by its ability to enforce 
communal decisions—by force, if necessary,” then it is left to the judge 
to “affirmatively sanction yet try to control and channel that violence to 
attain the law’s ends.”18  Cover and Wald both use the criminal trial and 
the role of the judge to illustrate the conventional view of the 
relationship of law and violence:  the defendant’s violence is outside the 
law and is met with law’s tempered violence through the judgment for 
punishment, even to the extreme case of the death penalty.19  In this 
context (and perhaps more broadly) legal interpretations serve to justify 
violence exercised by the state.20  These are “organized, social practices 
of violence” where the interpretation of what ought to be done is 
 
 13. This view of the connection between law and violence is reflected in essays by prominent 
legal theorist Robert Cover and former federal court judge Patricia Wald.  COVER, supra note 12, at 
203-38; Wald, supra note 1, at 77-104. 
 14. COVER, supra note 12, at 219. 
 15. Id. at 207.  This is not to suggest that Cover’s view lacks nuance; he is mindful of the role 
of ideology in law and of the unequal power relations at play.  Id. at 212. 
 16. Wald, supra note 1, at 77. 
 17. Id. at 78.  Wald characterizes this as “liv[ing] in paradoxical proximity to violence.”  Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. COVER, supra note 12, at 224-36; Wald, supra note 1, at 78-88.  Wald gives other 
examples in a civil law context, such as domestic violence (where the law’s violence can be a 
resource for victims) or the right to peaceful protest (where law must face the risk of violent 
responses to the protest).  Id. at 92-100. 
 20. COVER, supra note 12, at 203. 
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separated out from the act of doing the violence.21  Judges, then, are both 
linked to and separated from law’s violence.22   
Punishment is, then, a central feature of law as it strives to provide 
justice; the simple logic of the system states that if you break the law 
(and if you get caught), you will be punished.  Equally important, 
however, is the sense that law’s consequences are punishment rather 
than vengeance.  It is common, particularly among those within the legal 
system, to view the law as objective, rational, and impartial, rather than 
emotional, subjective, and biased.23  Underlying this view of the law is a 
sense that the move to rationalize punishment represents a sort of 
forward progress in the law, a channeling of violence into impartial 
bureaucracies or the hands of various experts to become discipline and 
punishment.24  Social theorists have problematized this view.25  They 
have suggested instead that the nature and type of legal institutions have 
 
 21. Id. at 203, 235.  Derrida points out, however, that interpretation itself may be “a juridico-
symbolic violence, a performative violence.” Derrida, supra note 4, at 995. 
 22. Cover suggests that judges may use their violent power by withholding it:  “A judge may 
or may not be able to change the deeds of official violence, but she may always withhold the 
justification for this violence.” COVER, supra note 12, at 228-29 n.48.  Although judges are 
distanced from the outcome of their decisions, Wald contends that judges must work to “retain the 
humanizing sense of accountability for imposing law’s violence on individual defendants.”  Wald, 
supra note 1, at 83. 
 23. See infra Part III for a discussion of law as bureaucracy. 
 24. .  In Discipline and Punish:  The Birth of the Prison, Foucault also considers the role of the 
judge but finds it less ennobling and expansive than either Cover or Wald.  In his view, the role of 
the judge is transformed by the move to disciplinary power.  In that framework, the police assume a 
more dominant role; judges become “the scarcely resisting employees of this apparatus.” 
FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 282. Instead of the courts, the prison, and more broadly the carceral, 
becomes the “model of justice itself.”  Id. at 302.  Foucault suggests that “[t]he carceral ‘naturalizes’ 
the legal power to punish, as it ‘legalizes’ the technical power to discipline.”  Id. at 303.  
Disciplinary power is “a type of power that the law validates and that justice uses as its favourite 
weapon.”  Id. at 302.  It operates by giving “the power to inflict legal punishment a context in which 
it appears to be free of all excess and all violence.”  Id.  In a sense, this is the separation between 
interpretation and violence that both Cover and Wald also describe. 
 25. Durkheim suggests two “laws” that explain quantitative and qualitative variations in 
punishment over time.  EMILE DURKHEIM, Two Laws of Penal Evolution, in EMILE DURKHEIM ON 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 153, 153-79 (Mark Traugott ed. & trans., The Univ. of Chicago Press 
1978) (1900).  Tracing the historical changes in punishment practices from torture and public 
executions to imprisonment outside of public view, he articulates his first “law”:  “The intensity of 
punishment is greater as societies belong to a less advanced type . . . and as centralized power has a 
more absolute power.”  Id. at 153.  This linkage of quantitative variations to macro considerations 
such as the type of society and the centralization of power follows the traditional view of “progress” 
in addressing crime in a society.  His second “law” folds in micro concerns of duration and intensity 
of the crime as influenced by increasing societal development:  “Punishments consisting in privation 
of freedom—and freedom alone—for lengths of time varying according to the gravity of the crime, 
tend more and more to become the normal type of repression.”  Id. at 164. 
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changed over time as the means of exercising power have also 
transformed.26 
Punishment under sovereign reign, centered on public execution, 
was understood as the vengeance of the sovereign.27  This common form 
of punishment was “more than an act of justice; it was a manifestation of 
force; or rather, it was justice as the physical, material and awesome 
force of the sovereign deployed there.”28  Over time, however, 
subsequent penal reform shifted from the idea of vengeance to the idea 
of defending society.29  Foucault describes this as the transformation of 
sovereign power to disciplinary power, and this transformation also 
reworks the legal system.30  The police and other non-judicial actors 
assume a more dominant role in the legal system, and this transformation 
results in a new form of law—“a mixture of legality and nature, 
prescriptions and constitution, the norm.”31  The power to punish 
extends beyond the sovereign to include the wide range of actors that are 
familiar today:  the police, the courts, the lawyers, the probation officers, 
the social workers, the prison guards, and so forth. 
In this new framework, the relations of power multiply, and this is a 
point that is easy to overlook in conventional views of law.  The 
violence of the law—even of legal interpretation and practices of 
punishment—does not occur on an equal playing field; law’s violence is 
implicated in relations of power, where “perpetrator and victim of 
organized violence will undergo achingly disparate significant 
 
 26. Durkheim concludes:  “If penal law is milder today than heretofore, it is not because the 
ancient institutions of criminal justice remained the same, little by little losing their rigor; rather, it 
is because they have been replaced by different institutions.”  Id. at 179.  Here, he accounts for the 
evolution by investigating “what gave birth to the prison in its original form and then what led to its 
later transformations.”  Id. at 166.  In many respects, Durkheim lays a foundation for Foucault’s 
later investigations in Discipline and Punish:  The Birth of the Prison.  FOUCAULT, supra note 12.  
Foucault’s work in this text precedes and foreshadows his later work on governmentality as he 
traces the exercise of punishment from sovereign society to disciplinary society.  See infra Part IV. 
 27. FOUCAULT, supra note 12 at 90. 
 28. Id. at 50. 
 29. Id. at 90. 
 30. Within the legal system, there is increasing use of the “simple instruments” of 
“hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and their combination in a procedure that is 
specific to it, the examination.”  Id. at 170. 
 31. Id. at 304.  Foucault suggests: 
Beneath the increasing leniency of punishment, then, one may map a displacement of its point of 
application; and through this displacement, a whole field of recent objects, a whole new system of 
truth and a mass of roles hitherto unknown in the exercise of criminal justice.  A corpus of 
knowledge, techniques, ‘scientific’ discourses is formed and becomes entangled with the practice of 
the power to punish. 
Id. at 22-23. 
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experiences.”32  Even the conventional view recognizes that the ideology 
of law as a civilizer of violence “is much more significant in justifying 
an order to those who principally benefit from it and who must defend it 
than it is in hiding the nature of the order from those who are its 
victims.”33  Simply put, the judge is more likely to believe that the legal 
system tempers violence than the defendant and his or her community 
(and, likely, the crime victims).  This recognition, however, is ultimately 
reconciled in, or obscured by, the belief that law serves to domesticate 
violence, that those with power in the system can use their power (and 
the law) for benign purposes, to restrain other, non-authorized forms of 
violence.34  This view results in a focus on institutions as dominant—and 
identifying—features of law, and it also lead to questions about 
international law’s status as law when it appears to lack these features.  
How can international law be law without the means to enforce, to 
punish, to meet unauthorized violence with authorized violence?  
Alternative views of law as violence offer insight on this fundamental 
question. 
B. Law as Enmeshed with Violence 
Although conventional theories of law as a substitute for or 
opposition to violence are useful ways of thinking about the nature of 
law and law’s work, there are also more critical views of law’s 
relationship to violence, which see the two as deeply enmeshed.35  These 
perspectives shift the focus from law’s use of violence to violence as a 
feature of law.  In a foundational essay, “Critique of Violence,” Walter 
Benjamin examines violence through its relationship to law and justice.36  
His focus is on violence itself as a means, without concern for the 
 
 32. COVER, supra note 12, at 238. 
 33. Id. at 212.  Foucault also identifies this point:  “[t]he general juridical form that 
guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, 
everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-
egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines.”  FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 222. 
 34. COVER, supra note 12, at 236.  In judge-like fashion, Wald prescribes:  “The law’s 
violence must be rationed fairly and not denied to some individuals who need its protection.”  Wald, 
supra note 1, at 103.  In his essay on Cover, Austin Sarat problematizes this view.  Whereas Cover 
“reluctantly preferred” law’s violence, Sarat asks what “price is paid for law’s intimacy with 
violence.”  Austin Sarat, Robert Cover on Law and Violence, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE 
LAW:  THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER, supra note 12, at 261.  Sarat notes that violence “puts an 
end to interpretation and meaning construction,” and as a result law’s violence is “a continuous 
threat to law’s principal involvement in the production and maintenance of meaning in diverse 
normative communities.”  Id. at 257. 
 35. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 277-300; Derrida, supra note 4, at 919-1045. 
 36. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 277-300. 
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particular ends towards which it is directed (just or unjust, for 
example).37  He identifies two forms of violence as means—law-making 
violence and law-preserving violence.38  Law-making violence is an 
originating violence, the violence that establishes law, and law-
preserving violence is a maintaining violence, which sustains law’s 
power (though these distinctions ultimately break down).39 
Benjamin argues that in the quest to find the original source of 
legitimacy for law, one must end up with—or rather begin with—
violence.40  In a basic sense, law-making violence is about power as it 
establishes the new order.41  Law’s oft-noted interest in a holding a 
monopoly on violence is a law-preserving violence, concerned with 
maintaining power, because “violence, when not in the hands of the law, 
threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence 
outside the law.”42  As a result, “all violence as a means . . . is implicated 
in the problematic nature of law itself.”43  This illuminates an essential 
role for violence in law.  Violence is enmeshed with law; it is present in 
the foundational moment of law and also serves to preserve law and the 
legal order.  In some sense, Benjamin’s idea of law-preserving violence 
supplements the conventional view as much as it challenges it; it 
grounds law in violence rather than in opposition to it, and it expands 
law’s use of violence to the preservation of itself. 
Other theorists have both critiqued and extended this view of law’s 
intimacy with violence.44  Jacques Derrida begins his inquiry with a 
revealing point of language regarding the common expression of “the 
force of law.”45  He emphasizes that “there is no law without 
enforceability, and no applicability or enforceability of the law without 
 
 37.  Benjamin sets aside the conventional understandings of natural law and positive law, 
which both feature in contemporary human rights law and practice, and which evaluate violence 
either through its connection to just ends or through its use of legal means.  Id. at 277. 
 38. Id. at 287. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 295. 
 41. Id. 
 42. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 281.  Like the conventional theorists, Benjamin also draws 
upon the example of the death penalty.  However, Benjamin suggests that “in the exercise of 
violence over life and death more than in any other legal act, law reaffirms itself.”  Id. at 286. 
 43. Id. at 287. 
 44. Derrida, supra note 4, at 919-1045. 
 45. Derrida points out that “law is always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is 
justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or 
unjustifiable.”  Id. at 925.  Derrida also engages directly with Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, 
noting that violence for Benjamin includes “both violence and legitimate power, justified authority.”  
Id. at 927. 
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force.”46  The relationship of force or violence to law is a complex one, 
particularly when one considers the emergence of law (and even justice); 
law itself emerges from violence that is not yet legal or authorized (nor 
illegal or unauthorized) in the founding moment.47  However, law and 
violence are entwined even beyond this originating moment.  Law 
“claims to exercise itself in the name of justice and that justice is 
required to establish itself in the name of a law that must be 
‘enforced.’”48 
Law-preserving violence and law-making violence are in a 
dialectical relationship.49  Derrida suggests that founding law and 
conserving law eventually collapse into one another.50  This becomes 
evident—and particularly relevant to the context of international law—in 
examining the origin of the state.  Derrida suggests, “The foundation of 
all states occurs in a situation that we can thus call revolutionary.  It 
inaugurates a new law; it always does so in violence.”51  Law-making 
violence is the revolutionary moment, the creation of a new state and a 
new law; in fact, it is an exceptional moment, even “an instance of non-
law” as it exists outside the law. 52  Law-preserving violence seeks to 
conserve that new state and new law, and this may often be the 
conventional, and more familiar, violence of law that seeks to punish 
threats to the existing legal and social order.  However, there is always a 
contradiction in that the founding violence can be repeated and a new 
law established.53 
 
 46. Id. at 926-27.  Derrida takes an expansive view of force, which may be “direct or indirect, 
physical or symbolic, exterior or interior, brutal or subtly discursive and hermeneutic, coercive or 
regulative, and so forth.”  Id. at 927. 
 47. Id. at 943.  Derrida provides a foundation for connecting it to the international realm by 
linking it to the origin of the state.  Id. at 1007. 
 48. Id. at 959, 961.  Derrida explains:  “Justice, as law, is never exercised without a decision 
that cuts, that divides,” and in its violence, law “claims to recognize and defend said humanity as 
end, in the person of each individual.”  Id. at 963, 1003. 
 49.  BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 300.  In fact, Benjamin contends that “[w]hen the 
consciousness of [the latent pretence of] violence in a legal institution disappears, the institution 
falls into decay.”  Id. at 288. 
 50. Derrida contends that law “is both threatening and threatened by itself.”  Derrida, supra 
note 4, at 1003.  Thus, it begins the process of decay identified by Benjamin, “the trajectory of 
decline, of institutional ‘degeneracy.’”  Id. at 1015. 
 51. Id. at 991. 
 52. Id.  Derrida also contextualizes Benjamin’s essay as reflecting “the crisis in the European 
model of bourgeois, liberal, parliamentary democracy, and so the crisis in the concept of droit that is 
inseparable from it.”  Interestingly, his own context is 1989-1990 at a different time of upheaval 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new nations out of the former Soviet 
bloc.  Id. at 979. 
 53. Derrida calls this the “paradox of iterability.”  Id. at 1007. 
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This more complicated view of law’s violence, particularly in 
exceptional moments, has been elaborated further in Giorgio Agamben’s 
work.54  Here, the focus is not on the founding moment of law, but rather 
on an instance of non-law; he looks to the “state of exception,” where 
the law is suspended, to reveal law’s violence.55  Agamben asks what 
happens to law when the law is not erased or replaced but is deactivated 
and inactive.56  Because the state of exception appears to be both inside 
and outside the juridical order, it illuminates both the presence of law 
and the absence of law, the efficacy of law and the force of law.57  The 
state of exception essentially separates the force of law (its “formal 
essence”) from the law itself.58  It is “the opening of a space” where “in 
order to apply a norm it is ultimately necessary to suspend its 
application, to produce an exception.”59 
In this context, there are real dangers to the juridical order and 
beyond.60  Agamben discusses these risks when a domestic sovereign 
suspends law in the name of emergency, but something very similar 
happens in international intervention.  Domestic law is suspended or 
overtaken in response to conflict or crisis; although a new legal 
framework is ultimately (re)instated, international authority often 
governs in the interim and in the name of the law but without 
meaningful legal constraint.  Despite the grim possibilities in these 
exceptional moments, however, there may also be opportunity in the 
deactivation of the law.  To explore the possibilities of the open space of 
 
 54. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005).  Like Derrida, 
Agamben engages directly with Benjamin’s earlier work on violence and law, examining the debate 
between Benjamin and Carl Schmitt; at issue in their debate “is the relation between violence and 
law—in the last analysis, the status of violence as a cipher for human action” in the zone of anomie 
that is the state of exception.  Id. at 59. 
 55. The state of exception “is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law’s 
threshold or limit concept.”  Id. at 4. 
 56. Id. at 64.  Agamben traces the history of the state of exception in the European and 
American contexts from World War I forward, illustrating its gradual progression from exception to 
rule.  In many ways, the state of exception is grounded in, but distinct from, the idea of necessity, 
which has its own complex relationship to law.  Id. at 24-28.  Agamben also notes that the state of 
exception appears related to dictatorship although he cautions that it is “not a dictatorship . . . but a 
space devoid of law.”  Id. at 50. 
 57. Id. at 37. 
 58. Id. at 38. 
 59. Id. at 40.  Agamben also characterizes it as “an emptiness and standstill of the law.”  Id. at 
48. 
 60. This is particularly the case when the state of exception results in power and authority 
combined in one person:  “The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted 
with impunity by a governmental violence that—while ignoring international law externally and 
producing a permanent state of exception internally—nevertheless still claims to be applying the 
law.”  AGAMBEN, supra note 54,  at 87. 
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the state of exception requires severing the connection between law and 
violence and beginning to re-imagine the possible uses of law 
disconnected from violence.61  Or, more simply, it may just require 
beginning to ask what “price is paid for law’s intimacy with violence.”62  
This foundational question is one that critical theorists have engaged 
with and begun to explore through a deeper examination of the ways in 
which law and violence are enmeshed.  Although international 
intervention aspires to restore law disconnected from violence, it seldom 
asks the more important questions about how law and violence are 
enmeshed and what costs that may exact. 
C. Law and Violence in Humanitarian Intervention 
Although domestic examples of criminal law, as well as more 
exceptional moments of revolution and emergency, are typically used by 
theorists to illuminate law’s violence and the collapse of law-making and 
law-preserving violence into one another, humanitarian intervention 
provides an equally compelling example of law’s violence in the 
international realm.  However, the analysis and critique of humanitarian 
intervention, human rights, and human rights law has typically focused 
on its bureaucratic and governmentalizing tendencies.63  The role of 
violence has seldom been discussed, usually for one of two primary 
reasons.  The first is grounded in international law’s crisis of identity—is 
it really law at all?64  As suggested by conventional views of law and 
violence, the most frequent reason that is given to undermine 
international law’s status as law is that, simplistically put, there is no 
international judiciary, police force or even military to enforce it; 
international law is fundamentally a consent-based regime.65  
Particularly in the area of human rights, advocates are left to rely on 
 
 61. Id. at 88. 
 62. Sarat, supra note 34, at 261. 
 63. See infra Parts III and IV. 
 64. See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 72.  But see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE 
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (setting forth a rational choice theory of international law). 
 65. Although private international law, in areas such as business and trade, can find analogies 
to contract and other domestic private law as a basis for efficacy and look to the “market” for 
enforcement, public international law struggles in the absence of an international sovereign or 
government.  See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 72-73; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 64, at 3.  See 
also Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty, The Practitioners’ Perspective, in 
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY:  CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 31-33 (Stephen D. 
Krasner ed., 2001) (describing these international commitments as the exercise of sovereignty, 
rather than limitations upon sovereignty); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645-46 (1997) (discussing the theory that internalized compliance and 
obedience increase comportment with international law). 
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strategies of persuasion and shame to ensure compliance.66  Because 
international law is often viewed as lacking in enforceability—necessary 
force—the absence of force or violence has typically been bemoaned 
and brushed aside.67 
Nonetheless, at present, a massive international institutional 
structure—in the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies and regional 
counter-parts, including many international tribunals (such as the 
International Criminal Court, the ad hoc war crimes tribunals, the 
International Court of Justice, and so on)—exists that focuses on 
implementation, if not enforcement, of international law.  Moreover, 
although there is not a single, unified international police or military, 
there are numerous alliances and instances of cooperative policing and 
use of force (Interpol, NATO, and the various military coalitions 
“authorized” to act by the United Nations Security Council) aimed at 
similar ends.  Therefore, the second and somewhat contradictory reason 
that law’s violence has not been commonly examined in international 
law is that the force that initiates and supports humanitarian intervention 
is viewed in isolation and justified as well-intentioned and necessary to 
avoid a greater violence.68  The question of violence then sidestepped or 
compartmentalized, the analysis turns to the work of capacity- or nation-
building and the establishment of the “rule of law.”  This somewhat 
contradictory status of international law serves as both incentive and 
justification for ignoring the role of violence or force in human rights 
law and practice.  It may be largely overlooked, of course, but that does 
not mean it is absent. 
Drawing upon the conventional and critical theories of law and 
violence discussed above, the force that supports international 
intervention can be problematized at both the micro level of the legal 
(and other) institutions at work during and after intervention and at the 
macro level of the geo-political dynamics of the intervention itself.  The 
conventional view of law as a civilizer of or restraint upon violence is 
one that would likely be embraced by many human rights practitioners 
and advocates of humanitarian intervention.69  At the micro level, this 
 
 66. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:  Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).  Goodman and Jinks discuss mechanisms of coercion, 
persuasion, and acculturation. 
 67. Id. at 633-38 (discussing coercion and persuasion). 
 68. See MARCHAK, supra note 8; RAZACK, supra note 9; KENNEDY, supra note 10. 
 69. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OPERATIONS, LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 9; 
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 8, at 268-69; Sally Engle Merry, Introduction to Part One:  
States of Violence, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL 
AND LOCAL 41, 41-48 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007). 
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view underpins the many international or quasi-international institutions 
that are modeled on domestic institutions, such as the numerous 
international tribunals that adjudicate individual responsibility for 
international crimes or monitor human rights treaty compliance.70  The 
domestic criminal trial has its counterpart in the war crimes cases before 
the International Criminal Court and the other ad hoc international war 
crimes tribunals, and domestic civil examples find their counterparts in 
more quotidian cases of human rights violations heard by treaty-
monitoring tribunals.71  Although there may be some recognition of the 
power disparities in these processes, they are reconciled with law’s role 
as domesticator of violence.  This view simultaneously acknowledges 
the violence of law and yet also justifies it; law’s violence, if not exactly 
benign, operates for the greater good.72 
The conventional view of law as domesticator of violence, in fact 
as both civilizer and evidence of civilization, is also relevant at the 
macro level.  Historically, it has served as a rationale in support of the 
extensive and aggressive interventions of colonialism.73  Early colonial 
endeavors were often justified by a perceived absence of law and a 
 
 70. See, e.g., Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts:  Local Empowerment and 
National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347 (2006) (assessing advantages 
and disadvantages of hybrid criminal tribunals and contrasting them to ad hoc tribunals such as the 
ICTY and ICTR); Patricia M. Wald, International Criminal Tribunals in the 21st Century:  Iraq, 
Cambodia, and International Justice, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 541 (2006) (discussing war crimes 
tribunals in Iraq and Cambodia); Laura A. Dickinson, Transitional Justice in Afghanistan:  The 
Promise of Mixed Tribunals, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 23 (2002) (discussing tribunals in 
Kosovo and East Timor); Michael Lieberman, Salvaging the Remains:  The Khmer Rouge Tribunal 
on Trial, 186 MIL. L. REV. 164 (2005) (discussing proposed tribunal for Cambodia). 
 71. Interestingly, law’s reach is often more extensive in those contexts, where the 
responsibility of the state (or its subsidiary organs) is at issue, rather than the responsibility of an 
individual defendant.  See Elizabeth M. Bruch, Hybrid Courts:  Examining Hybridity Through a 
Post-Colonial Lens, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2010); Timothy Cornell & Lance Salisbury, The 
Importance of Civil Law in the Transition to Peace:  Lessons from the Human Rights Chamber for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 389 (2002); Wald, supra note 1, at 88-103 
(describing law’s violence in the civil context of domestic law).  In fact, Patricia Wald offers a good 
illustration of the reach of the conventional view beyond the domestic level and into the 
international level, given her status as first a U.S. federal judge and then later as a judge on the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. 
 72. See supra Part II.A. 
 73. Gil Gott uses historical analysis of colonial regimes in an effort at a “critical 
historicization of the modern human rights project.”  Gil Gott, Imperial Humanitarianism:  History 
of an Arrested Dialectic, in MORAL IMPERIALISM:  A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 19, 19 (Berta 
Esperanza Hernández-Truyol ed., 2002).  He shows that “humanitarian discourse did more than 
provide cover for the raw power ambitions of the imperial states . . . [it] formed a kind of partially 
arrested dialectic, whereby the transnational humanitarian identity became an important articulation 
point of imperialism.”  Id. at 30.  He suggests that a critical human rights project must recognize and 
“break with received forms of humanitarianism.”  Id. at 35. 
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prevalence of (uncivilized, barbaric) violence among the colonized.74  
Law was brought to the uncivilized through the overt violence of 
forceful occupation as well as through the indirect violence of the 
importation of a new legal framework.  Far from being a relic of the 
past, however, this “discourse of ‘the West and the Rest’ is alive and 
well in the modern world” as it echoes through current humanitarian 
interventions.75  At times, such as in Rwanda or Haiti, the imperial 
legacy that supports the contemporary intervention is direct and obvious; 
in other situations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, it may be a more indirect 
legacy of form and structure.76  As in earlier imperial endeavors, a 
central theme that underlies the rationale for such intervention is the 
“absence of law, including international law, and a lack of sustained 
engagement by international organizations” in areas of crisis.77  In this 
context, law’s violence reemerges as the texts of international law—the 
UN Charter, human rights treaties, Security Council Resolutions—
“authorize particular violent acts as legitimate” when supported by 
humanitarian rationales.78 
Although such humanitarian endeavors linked with force are not 
new, they are increasingly common (and controversial) at the 
international level. 
Even in the contemporary era, debates about humanitarian 
intervention reflect both conventional and critical views of law in 
relation to violence.  For example, the idea of a “responsibility to 
protect” has increasingly gained prominence at the international level.79  
This doctrine suggests that “where a population is suffering serious 
harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, 
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the 
 
 74. Stuart Hall explains that early European explorers “were immediately struck by what they 
interpreted as the absence of government and civil society—the basis of all ‘civilization’—among 
peoples of the New World.” Stuart Hall, The West and the Rest:  Discourse and Power, in 
FORMATIONS OF MODERNITY 275, 303 (Stuart Hall & Bram Gieben eds., 1992).  Later imperial 
efforts reflected the same views, influenced in part by early sociological thinkers.  Id. at 314-15. 
 75. Id. at 318.  See Gott, supra note 73, at 19-38; RAZACK, supra note 9. 
 76. In each of these examples, however, the “international community” takes on the imperial 
role, forcefully intervening for the sake of establishing the rule of law; this rule of law replaces, 
domesticates and redeploys violence for its own ends.  Orford characterizes collective humanitarian 
intervention as a “willingness to use force in the name of humanitarian values.”  ORFORD, supra 
note 3, at 2.  See RAZACK, supra note 9, at 165; Bruch, supra note 71. 
 77. ORFORD, supra note 3, at 15. 
 78. Id. at 50. 
 79.  See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT:  REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY (2001); MARCHAK, supra note 8.  See also SPENCER ZIFCAK, UNITED NATIONS 
REFORM:  HEADING NORTH OR SOUTH? (2009). 
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principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect.”80  In many ways, it reflects the influence of the discourse of 
“the West and the Rest” and its dialectical impulses towards violence 
and governance.81  It is based on a belief in a disinterested, Western 
humanitarian impulse to establish the “rule of law” with little 
recognition of Western self-interest in intervention (or even complicity 
in the situations of conflict or transition that serve to justify 
intervention).82  Moreover, there is the “paradox of humanitarian goals 
accomplished by force,” which is often legitimated by the language of 
human rights.83  The narratives of these interventions reveal “deeply 
internalized myths about our civilizing mission” in the West (or, now, 
the Global North).84  Law, in this context, serves to distract from the 
violence of the intervention and restore a sense of innocence in both 
intention and action.85  In fact, originating violence becomes justified 
through “the narrative of choice”—where nations (again, usually of the 
West or Global North) must either stand by as atrocities occur or 
intervene militarily to establish a new legal order.86  It is a new 
revolutionary or exceptional moment.  Framed as choice, “[v]iolence 
 
 80. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 79; 
MARCHAK, supra note 8, at 6. 
 81. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 79; 
MARCHAK, supra note 8.  Marchak takes a generally supportive view of humanitarian intervention, 
broadly defined to include both military and non-military interventions.  Through case studies of 
interventions in the “broken societies” of Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, Marchak illustrates the 
complexities of humanitarian (or other) engagement in real contexts.  Id. at 97.  However, the focus 
is on practical failures of these endeavors, rather than broader theoretical concerns about their 
connections to earlier colonial enterprises and Cold War interventions or problematizing notions 
such as the emerging doctrine of a “responsibility to protect.”  Id. at 37.  Marchak concludes that 
“success for humanitarian interventionist strategies is dependent on knowing who the combatants 
are, knowing why they are in conflict, and having an articulated and publicly understood yet 
disinterested objective.”  Id. at 287.  Without these conditions, “interventions under present world 
circumstances should be avoided unless both or all combatants request it.”  Id. 
 82. But see MARCHAK, supra note 8, at 290-91.  Marchak states, “While external powers 
attempt to influence broken societies by introducing Western legal systems and courts, the one thing 
still missing is their acknowledgement of their own culpability for some of these happenings.” 
 83. RAZACK, supra note 9, at 40, 44.  Razack focuses on legal proceedings that followed 
incidents of violence by Canadian peacekeepers against Somali civilians, noting that “[l]aw has an 
important role to play . . . for it is in the courtroom and at hearings that a public truth is proclaimed 
about who we are as a people and as a nation.”  Id. at 8. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 149.  Although Razack’s focus is on Somalia, she also considers peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement missions in Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere; she concludes that “[n]o peacekeeping 
mission involving Western peacekeepers seems to have been without violence directed at the local 
population.”  Id. at 53. 
 86. Id. at 150. 
6_BRUCH_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM 2/22/2011  2:08 PM 
350 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:333 
helps establish who is, in fact, in control.”87  However, it remains a self-
denying violence that justifies and thereby renders invisible the force 
exercised in the name of humanity. 
Humanitarian intervention and the international law that is 
deployed in its support, thus, operate with law’s violence along similar 
paths as the domestic law considered by both conventional and critical 
theorists.  From the early history of colonialism to contemporary 
projects of international intervention, it is possible to trace that violence.  
Like revolution, humanitarian intervention establishes a new law and, 
often, a new state out of violence.  It is a forceful violence that 
intervenes militarily to establish and to preserve a new legal order.  It 
enforces the rule of law at both the national and the international level.  
Although the originating violence in this context is typically cloaked in 
legality (or, at least, justice), it is a contested rather than a stable legality.  
It is an interpretive violence that recognizes only certain forms of law as 
law and that remakes existing regimes in its image.  This interpretive 
violence supports both the decision to intervene and the subsequent 
practices of the institutions that operate the new legal regime.  It also 
legitimates itself in the new law—international human rights law or, 
more broadly, the “rule of law”—that it establishes.  Yet, the new legal 
order remains vulnerable, perhaps more obviously so than more 
established states; there is always the threat of a new revolutionary 
moment that will destroy the existing legal order and install yet another 
new order.  This threat exists for both the new national legal order and 
the international legal order.  This, then, justifies continuing 
international involvement, even force, to (re)establish the rule of law.  
International law, like domestic law, is co-implicated with violence. 
III.  THE RULE(S) OF LAW:  BUREAUCRACY AND EXPERTISE IN PROJECTS 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
In contrast to violence, the connections between law and 
bureaucracy are more readily apparent as fundamental features of the 
state and domestic legal system as well as the international legal domain.  
Law’s quest for objectivity and rationality underscore the importance of 
bureaucracy, from the massive administrative apparatus of the “justice” 
system to the extensive and wide-ranging codification of legal doctrine.  
These features are evident not just in the practices of law, but also in the 
work of individuals and institutions, the various experts in law and 
 
 87. Id. at 156.  However, seeing the choice “as starkly as a choice between going and not 
going is again to remain within the moral universe of imperialism.”  Id. at 164-65. 
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otherwise, that participate in its processes.  This section will elaborate 
the development and proliferation of law’s bureaucracies and will 
consider the role of expertise in that context.  It will then examine the 
ways in which this bureaucratic dimension of law manifests itself in 
humanitarian interventions and the human rights legal regimes they 
establish. 
A. Bureaucracy and Law 
Social theorists have long considered the links between law and 
bureaucracy.  Early sociologist (and trained lawyer) Max Weber shows 
how bureaucracy operates in the administration of justice, through the 
development of “rational” legal procedures and formalized legal 
concepts.88  Like the theorists of violence and law, Weber was interested 
in the origination of law and its subsequent legitimacy.89  In his view, a 
simple norm or rule became law if it was enforced by “psychological or 
physical coercion by a staff of people.”90  Thus, a sense of force 
underlies his understanding of law, and both force and bureaucracy are 
present in his definition of the state.  For Weber, the state is a 
“compulsory political organization with continuous operations . . . 
insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force.”91  While force may be 
foundational, however, law’s process itself is rational and bureaucratic. 
In fact, in Weber’s view, the modern state is “completely dependent 
on bureaucracy,” and the longer the process of bureaucratization goes 
 
 88. WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:  
SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4, at 352. 
 89. See TURNER & FACTOR, supra note 4.  Weber considered systems of law and convention 
as “orders” included within “uniformities of action.”  Id. at 82.  Legitimacy and beliefs about 
legitimacy, in contrast to questions of validity, are essential in this context.  Id. at 101.  Weber 
distinguishes between convention and law by the consequences that result from deviation.  If 
deviation results in disapproval by the social group, it is a convention; if it results in “psychological 
or physical coercion by a staff of people,” it is law.  Id. at 102. 
 90. Id.  Law’s origins, however, are not in violence nor in rationality, but rather in something 
outside of both.  This is because of an “inherent limitation” in rationalization, which is that the end 
goals themselves cannot be rationalized.  Id. at 176.  Although “Weber understood the process of 
‘positivization’ of the law as an adjunct to the historical process of rationalization, or rather as a 
form of this process,” he nonetheless concluded that “[w]hat positivism inadvertently produces is a 
concept of the law that can be grounded only in a kind of ‘faith.’”  Id. at 172-73. 
 91. Id. at 104.  However, as Turner and Factor note, “Weber argues that legitimacy and the 
state evolve separately . . . legitimacy does not evolve . . . out of force.”  Id. at 108.  Instead, Weber 
concluded that law emerged by revelation, and that legal formalism reflects “in some sense a 
residue of the magical element in primitive law.”  Id. at 109. 
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on, the further it extends.92  This increasing bureaucratization is caused 
by the intensification of demands on administration as societies become 
increasingly complex.93  This complexity encompasses increased social 
responsibilities, modern forms of interaction and communication, and 
political sophistication.94  In terms of political factors, the most 
significant is the social demand for stability, order, and protection.95  
Thus, bureaucracy is an instrument and feature of law and order; it offers 
its unique attributes of “[p]recision, dispatch, clarity, familiarity with the 
documents, continuity, discretion, uniformity” and reduced material and 
personal costs.96  However, there are other costs to a bureaucratic 
system—such systems are inflexible, rigidly hierarchical, almost 
mechanized.97  The administrators and officials are dehumanized, in a 
sense, as the professional and objective office is separated from private 
life and subjective sensibilities.98  At the same time, other participants 
are also dehumanized as bureaucratic practice focuses on general rules 
and disregards individual, particular situations.99 
Along with the rise of the legal bureaucracy comes the increasing 
rationalization of the law and legal system.100  In both civil and common 
law systems, “[t]ypification, one-sided selectivity, idealization 
(especially in the context of instruction), rationalization, and 
codification” become central to processes of developing and applying 
the law.101  These same practices remain central to the law in 
contemporary settings.  In fact, this leads to a common conception of the 
law as “scientific” or “objective.”102  Law and science both appear to 
 
 92. WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:  
SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4, at 347.  He continues:  “the bureaucratisation is all the 
more complete the bigger the state is, and above all, the more it is or becomes a great power.”  Id. 
 93. Id. at 348. 
 94. Id. at 349. 
 95. Weber characterizes this as “the increasing need felt by a society grown accustomed to 
stable and absolute peace for order and protection (‘police’) in all areas.”  Id. 
 96. Id. at 350. 
 97.  Id. at 344-45. 
 98. WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:  
SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4, at 344-45. 
 99. Id. at 351. 
 100. Weber’s work on law, perhaps reflecting his training and practice as a lawyer before he 
turned to sociology, also emphasizes the rationalization of law.  In Max Weber:  The Lawyer as 
Social Thinker, Stephen Turner and Regis Factor trace Weber’s personal transformation and his 
theoretical transformation of legal science into his sociology.  TURNER & FACTOR, supra note 4. 
 101. Id. at 140. 
 102. Bruno Latour, Scientific Objects and Legal Objectivity, in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY AND 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL:  MAKING PERSONS AND THINGS 73, 73-114 (Alain Pottage & 
Martha Mundy eds., 2004). 
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“emphasise the virtues of a disinterested and unprejudiced approach, 
based on distance and precision.”103  Nonetheless, there remain 
important distinctions as well; law’s quest for “objectivity” centers on 
the sort of indifference and distance characteristic of bureaucracy.104  
Again, the role of the judge provides illustration.  Judges hold an 
important place in the legal hierarchy and exercise their power through 
interpretation and judgment.105  Under their guidance, the system 
“appears to partake both of the positive logic of science and the 
normative logic of morality and thus to be capable of compelling 
universal acceptance through an inevitability which is simultaneously 
logical and ethical.”106  The rationalization of the legal process provides 
judicial decision-making with its effectiveness by “granting the status of 
judgment to a legal decision which no doubt owes more to the ethical 
dispositions of the actors than to the pure norms of the law.”107  Law 
 
 103. Id. at 73.  Latour continues:  “in both domains participants speak esoteric languages and 
reason in carefully cultivated styles.”  Id.  Both involve “a kind of proof or ordeal,” as well as 
“speech, facts, judgments, authorities, writing, inscriptions, all manner of recordings and archives, 
reference works, colleagues, and disputes.”  Id. at 77, 82.  However, Latour proceeds to destabilize 
these easy comparisons.  Although “judges appropriate the scientist’s white coat in order to 
represent their role” and “scientists borrow the judge’s robes of purple and ermine in order to 
establish their authority,” in fact there are important differences.  Id. at 106. 
 104. Latour suggests that in science the object itself is judge. Id. at 106-07.  In contrast, legal 
objectivity “depends entirely on a quality of speech, deportment, dress, and on a form of 
enunciation.”  Id. at 107.  Ultimately, lawyers and scientists have different tasks, and Latour argues 
that “science should not be asked to judge, and . . . law should not be asked to pronounce truth.”  Id. 
at 113. 
 105. In this context, judicial power “demonstrates the special point of view, transcending 
individual perspectives—the sovereign vision of the State.” Pierre Bourdiew, The Force of Law:  
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 838 (1987).  Bourdiew also 
scrutinizes issues of power, judgment and violence in the work of legal professionals.  Power within 
the juridical field is tied to power more broadly, and Bourdiew, echoing the classic definition of the 
state, notes the “permanent conflict between competing claims to the monopoly on the legitimate 
exercise of juridical power.”  Id. at 824. 
 106. Id. at 818.  There is also a division of labor within the juridical field that “constitutes the 
true basis of a system of norms and practices which appears as if it were founded a priori in the 
equity of its principles, in the coherence of its formulations, and in the rigor of its application.”  Id.  
However, interpretation is not solely a judicial act, and it is also implicated within power relations.  
Bourdiew explains, “The practical content of the law which emerges in the judgment is the product 
of a symbolic struggle between professionals possessing unequal technical skills and social 
influence,” and the real meaning of a rule “can be discovered in the specific power relation between 
professionals.”  Id. at 827. 
 107. Id. at 828 (emphasis in original).  This process is not simply a rhetorical mask; it is “the 
expression of the whole operation of the juridical field and, in particular, of the work of 
rationalization to which the system of juridical norms is continually subordinated.”  Id. at 820. 
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decides, and it does so through processes constructed as rational and 
objective, removed from the individuals involved.108 
Once established, the bureaucracy of law has spread and flourished, 
facilitated through processes of institutional isomorphism that lead to a 
similarity of structures across society (and across societies).109  
DiMaggio and Powell identify three mechanisms of isomorphic 
change—coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism—which 
operate primarily in the intertwined realms of the state, law, and 
education.110  Coercive isomorphism occurs when change is mandated 
by authority and, where necessary, enforced.  The state and the law are 
central in processes of coercive isomorphism;111 this is the force, the 
violence, of law.  In addition to coercive isomorphism, however, law is 
also relevant in mimetic processes of isomorphism, where an institution 
mimics or copies the conduct of other institutions for reasons other than 
coercion.112  Because of the general power of the state, there is social 
pressure to follow the practices of institutions that are successful within 
the system; the practices of those institutions are, in turn, shaped by the 
legal regime at work.  Finally, the third mechanism of institutional 
isomorphism, normative pressure, is also evident in both the law and the 
working of the state system.113  Normative pressure is the sense of 
“should” or “ought” that underlies the choice for a particular system or 
process.114  Law is also at work in normative processes when legal 
education is standardized (in part, through law), and lawyers are 
ubiquitous in government bureaucracies and legislatures.115 
 
 108. Bourdiew explains that there is a process of rationalization at work in the juridical field 
that results in a “social division between lay people and professionals” and that “constantly 
increase[es] the separation between judgments based upon the law and naïve intuitions of fairness.”  
Id. at 817.  Deploying his concept of habitus, he suggests that “[t]he predictability and calculability 
that Weber imputed to “rational law” doubtless arise more than anything else from the consistency 
and homogeneity of the legal habitus.”  Id. at 833. 
 109. Institutional isomorphism is the process that results in homogeneity of structures across 
society due to social constraints.  Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:  
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 146, 146-61 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., Blackwell Publishers 2d ed. 2007) 
(1983).  See also Goodman & Jinks, supra note 66, at 650 (discussing processes of isomorphism in 
human rights). 
 110. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 109, at 149. 
 111. Id. at 150. 
 112. Id. at 151. 
 113. Id. at 152. 
 114. Education plays an essential role here, as well as systems of professionalization and 
socialization.  Id. at 153-54. 
 115. Turner and Factor note that “[t]he courtroom is an artificial setting, like the laboratory, 
and, as with the laboratory, special training is required to understand fully what is going on within 
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Processes of isomorphism help explain the increasing 
rationalization of law and its systems and the proliferation of particular 
types of systems, domestically as well as transnationally and 
internationally.  Mimetic and normative processes are manifest in the 
prevalence of “model laws,” uniform documents and processes, 
standardized education, and “best practices.”  Yet law’s bureaucracy is 
not distinct from law’s violence.116  Coercion and force do not disappear; 
rather, they become techniques, subject to bureaucratic, technical 
considerations.117 
B. The Role of the Expert 
The role of the “objective” expert is essential as law does its work 
through the bureaucratic practices of the individuals and institutions who 
wield its power.  Weber has traced the emergence of expertise in his 
history of the rise of legal rationality.118  Although his focus is on the 
development of law and procedure, the role of the expert is threaded 
throughout: 
From a theoretical point of view, the general development of law and 
procedure may be viewed as passing through the following stages:  
first, charismatic legal revelation through “law prophets”; second, 
empirical creation and finding of law through legal honoratiores, i.e., 
law creation through cautelary jurisprudence and adherence to 
precedent; third, imposition of law by secular or theocratic powers; 
fourth and finally, systematic elaboration of law and professionalized 
administration of justice by persons who have received their legal 
training in a learned and formally logical manner.119 
 
it.”  TURNER & FACTOR, supra note 4, at 18.  As a part of their training, lawyers learn to exclude 
“non-legal” elements of reality from consideration within the legal system.  Id. at 132. 
 116. Zygmunt Bauman also presents an analysis that explicates the links between bureaucracy 
and violence in Modernity and the Holocaust.  ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE 
HOLOCAUST (1989).  It was a failure of civilization—and of law—because “all those intricate 
networks of checks and balances, barriers and hurdles which the civilizing process has erected and 
which, as we hope and trust, would defend us from violence and constrain all over ambitious and 
unscrupulous powers, have been proven ineffective.”  Id. at 87.  Bauman contends that the 
Holocaust was enabled by “the ability of modern bureaucracy to co-ordinate the action of great 
number[s] of moral individuals in the pursuit of any, also immoral, ends.”  Id. at 18.  This was 
accomplished through “routine bureaucratic procedures:  means-ends calculus, budget balancing, 
universal rule application.”  Id. at 17 (emphasis in original). 
 117. Id.  Bourdiew also reminds us that “the State alone holds the monopoly of legitimized 
symbolic violence.” Bourdiew, supra note 105, at 838. 
 118. WEBER, supra note 2, at 641-900. 
 119. Id. at 882. 
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In fact, Weber contrasts the role of the legal expert in the 
rationalized legal system with the exceptional case of the jury, where 
laypersons can adjudicate according to “irrational” standards.120  Trained 
jurists are distinguished by “that special capacity which results from 
specialized professional training, viz., the capacity to state clearly and 
unambiguously the legal issue involved in a complicated situation.”121 
These university-trained jurists and advocates—due to their 
expertise—become an important aspect of the development of the 
rational state as well as the rationalized legal system.122  In this context, 
a decisive quality is judgment:  “the ability to maintain one’s inner 
composure and calm while being receptive to realities, in other words 
distance from things and people.”123  This same sense of a trained, 
impersonal, and “objective” specialist appears in the role of the 
bureaucratic official generally.124  As bureaucracy rationalizes and 
dehumanizes itself, it increasingly relies upon the expert “who is all the 
more indifferent in human terms, and so all the more completely 
“objective” the more complex and specialised the culture becomes.”125 
As with law’s violence, this understanding of law’s bureaucracy 
raises questions of power.  The increasing rationalization of the legal 
system and the rise of expertise reflect a political transformation and a 
new type of power relations.126  Judicial power, which has been central, 
 
 120. Id. at 892-95. 
 121. Id. at 853. 
 122. Weber elaborates the role of the expert, particularly the legal expert, in his broader 
discussion of politics and politicians (where lawyers often play a significant role).  MAX WEBER, 
The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in WEBER:  POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 328-29 (Peter 
Lassman & Ronald Speirs eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1919).  He traces the rise of 
“professional officialdom,” first as a counter-force to autocratic rule and then as a counterpart to 
political officials.  Id. at 322-25. 
 123. Id. at 353 (emphasis in original).  Weber continues:  “A ‘lack of distance’, in and of itself, 
is one of the deadly sins for any politician and it is one of those qualities which will condemn our 
future intellectuals to political incompetence if they cultivate it.”  Id. at 353. 
 124. See WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:  
SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4, at 341-54. 
 125. Id. at 351. 
 126. Foucault also traces the origin of the legal system with attention to increased 
rationalization and the rise of a system of “inquiry.”  3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Juridical 
Forms, in POWER:  ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954-1984 1, 48 (James D. Faubion ed., 
Robert Hurley et al. trans., The New Press 1994) (1974).  He begins with an archaic form of the 
“rule-governed dispute, the challenge between the two warriors” that determines who is right rather 
than who speaks the truth.  Id. at 33.  In such a procedure, there was “no judge, judgment, inquiry, 
or testimony to determine who spoke the truth.”  Id.  However, over time, this process gives way to 
the elaboration of more rational forms of proof and demonstration through processes of inquiry and 
the juridical discovery of truth.  Id. at 33-34.  This new mode of proceeding broadens the dispute to 
include not just the interests of the parties in conflict, but also the interests of the sovereign (or 
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now operates in conjunction with a “whole network of nonjudicial 
power,” particularly the experts who become so prevalent in the 
bureaucratized state.127  These experts include the administrators, 
officials, staff, and consultants that are responsible for so much of the 
day to day work of the legal system.  They purport to offer certainty, 
clarity, distance, objectivity, and rationality to non-experts as they seek 
to navigate the complexities of the law, the legal system, or even the 
everyday world. 
C.  The Bureaucratization of Human Rights and the Emergence of the 
International Expert 
Law’s bureaucracy—and the rationalization of law and the 
significance of expertise—also manifests in international law and the 
international legal system.  These features are evident in the 
international human rights institutional and legal framework that is often 
partnered with humanitarian intervention.  Although social scientists 
have only begun to examine human rights and human rights law 
relatively recently, in their analyses, bureaucracy and instrumentalism 
have emerged as common themes.128  Annelise Riles suggests that “an 
 
state).  The settlement of disputes is “imposed from above,” and both the judge and prosecutor 
appear “as manifestations of the sovereign’s interest in the dispute.”  Id. at 42-43.  When the 
sovereign’s interest is asserted, the criminal is redefined as “the social enemy.”  Id. at 54. 
 127. Id. at 57.  The hierarchies embedded in relationships of “distant” and “objective” expertise 
have increasingly been interrogated and critiqued in recent decades in legal and social theory.  For 
example, feminist scholar Dorothy Smith critiques the pursuit of “objectivity” in expertise.  
DOROTHY E. SMITH, THE EVERYDAY WORLD AS PROBLEMATIC:  A FEMINIST SOCIOLOGY 105-45 
(1989).  Smith is primarily concerned with the expertise of the sociologist, but her analysis has 
broader relevance.  As an alternative to traditional views, Smith suggests a fundamental shift in the 
relationship of expert and non-expert that would discard “the detached scientific consciousness” that 
is so important to the idea of expertise, especially bureaucratic and legal expertise.  Id. at 111.  If 
non-expert laypeople are recognized as having their own form of expertise grounded in experience 
(like the expert), the expert loses some of the “distance” that underlies expertise.  Id. at 107, 110.  
The idea of the expert as exclusive holder and purveyor of objective knowledge is destabilized, and 
there is recognition that distance and detachment are socially constructed because the expert is 
never really “outside” the relations being observed, analyzed or interpreted.  Id. at 94. 
 128. Tola Olu Pearce, Human Rights and Sociology:  Some Observations from Africa, 48 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 48, 48-56 (2001); Riles, supra note 2, at 52-65; Malcolm Waters, Globalisation 
and the Social Construction of Human Rights, 31 J. SOCIOLOGY 29, 29-36 (1995).  Malcolm Waters 
explores the institutionalization of human rights from “a social constructionist point of view, a view 
that human rights is an institution that is specific to cultural and historical context just like any 
other, and that its very universality is itself a human construction.”  Id. at 32.  He traces the rise of 
current human rights discourse, its strategic use by global superpowers and the (intended and 
unintended) consequences for state sovereignty, and he concludes that human rights 
institutionalization is “the outcome of instrumental action by power groups seeking to realize their 
interests.”  Id. at 35.  Waters calls for investigation of the processes that have led to 
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instrumentalist conception of law is the agreed theoretical and political 
basis of modern U.S. law,” and this in turn has greatly influenced the 
development of international law, including human rights law.129  In 
familiar language, she contends that the “understanding of law as a tool 
or instrument also provides the concrete, day-to-day form of legal 
knowledge practice—that of thinking in terms of relations of means to 
ends.”130  This bureaucratic, “technocratic” approach in everyday 
practice has resulted in a view of human rights as “a set of problem-
solving institutions and of legal techniques deployed and managed by 
international bureaucrats.”131  These institutions and the international 
experts who manage them appear mostly obviously in the bureaucracies 
of the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies and institutions (and 
the regional inter-governmental organizations that are their 
counterparts).  However, similar institutions and models of expertise are 
also found in the international field presences established in 
humanitarian interventions. 
After an initial intervention, the international community typically 
establishes a formal bureaucracy and begins a process of governance of 
the local population, using ‘objective’ experts to accomplish its work.  
The human rights bureaucracies created in field missions under the 
auspices of inter-governmental and multi-state interventions aspire to 
and, at times, reflect familiar characteristics of objectivity, efficiency, 
rationality, and distance.  Often, they import with them a new and 
“rational” legal system, typically modeled on international law or 
 
institutionalization in human rights, and Pearce makes a related call for a closer look at the role of 
bureaucracy in human rights.  Id.; PEARCE, supra, at 53. 
 129. RILES, supra note 2, at 59. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  Despite its bureaucratic instrumentalism, the human rights apparatus is increasingly 
looked to as a potential source of power both within and outside the state.  Bryan Turner has noted 
the progression of rights discourse from a natural to a global discourse; he has also noted that 
scholars have focused attention on the political utility of rights as an articulation of “an international 
standard of justice.”  Bryan S. Turner, Introduction:  Rights and Communities:  Prolegomenon to a 
Sociology of Rights, 31 J. SOCIOLOGY 1, 7 (1995).  R.W. Connell elaborates on this view.  R.W. 
Connell, Sociology and Human Rights, 31 J. SOCIOLOGY 25, 25-29 (1995).  Connell departs from 
the common sociological critique of rights as either “a form of individualist ideology that conceals 
real social relations” or “a legal discourse that constructs a subjectivity inevitably subordinated to 
juridical state power.”  Id. at 25.  Instead, Connell explains that it is important to recognize “the 
diversity of situations in which rights talk is deployed, and grasp the different historical 
consequences of its deployment.”  Id. at 27.  Rights claims are an assertion of power, yet they also 
go beyond existing relations of power to “describe[] a state of practice that does not exist.”  Id. at 
28.  Echoing Cover’s earlier remarks about law as an “imagined future,” Connell suggests that 
claims of rights similarly reflect a “project,” “a vision of a world coming into existence.”  Id.; 
COVER, supra note 12, at 207. 
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standards.132  The processes of isomorphism that proliferate within 
bureaucratic systems (and lead to the reproduction of such systems 
themselves) are at work as these new, internationally approved 
frameworks are adopted or imposed in the name of (re)establishing the 
“rule of law.”133 
Historically, the idea of the rule of law has been linked to a 
democratic framework and self-governance, and in field missions, the 
development of such a framework has generally been the goal.  
However, in practice, it has been an approach of “externally imposing a 
rights framework outside the political process of debate and consensus-
building” in the affected nation.134  This is typically seen as 
unproblematic given the “universal” and “progressive” nature of human 
rights.135  Nonetheless, this approach creates a “rule of law paradox,” 
 
 132.  Law’s force becomes subject to bureaucratic, technical considerations as international 
interventions make this shift to the establishment of a field mission focused on rebuilding the 
nation.  See supra Part II.B, regarding the violence that accompanies this process of “bringing the 
law” to a nation in conflict or transition, as well as the echoes of the imperial past in such 
endeavors.  PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 101 (1992).  Fitzpatrick also 
suggests that in the imperial context, “law was pre-eminent amongst the ‘gifts’ of an expansive 
civilization, on which could extend in its abounding generosity to the entire globe.”  PETER 
FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW 178 (2001).  See ALBERT MEMMI, THE 
COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (1991) (discussing colonial relationships).  See also RAZACK, 
supra note 9, at 9-10 (noting a shared feature of both nineteenth century and contemporary projects 
of empire is “a deeply held belief in the need to and the right to dominate others for their own good, 
others who are expected to be grateful”) (emphasis in original). 
 133. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 66, at 650-51.  Goodman and Jinks discuss the ways in 
which human rights norms are spread based upon ideas dominant in the international arena rather 
than through internal development in affected states.  They suggest that “when states copy an 
internationally legitimated model that does not fit their local needs, one should expect a continued 
disjuncture between structural isomorphism (across states) and technical demands and results 
(within states).”  Id. at 651. 
 134.  David Chandler, The Bureaucratic Gaze of International Human Rights Law, in THE 
LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 128, 128-29 (Saladin Meckled-García and Başak Çali eds., 2006).  Chandler 
notes that “[t]he ‘rule of law’ did not mean merely that there was a set of rules and regulations or 
laws, but that this framework was predicated on consent, the equality of rights and the autonomy of 
individuals.”  Id. at 129.  It distinguishes itself from “the rule of bureaucratic regulation or 
authoritarian repression” and from “the ‘divine right’ of kings or the ‘civilizing’ mission of a 
colonial administration.”  Id. 
 135. See Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 71 (analyzing this power of the international 
community as a positive force in support of the rule of law).  But see PETER FITZPATRICK, THE 
MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 117-18 (1992) (noting how the “rule of law” has become a new 
“universal measure of appropriate behaviour” and as a marker of civilization in contrast to 
barbarism); FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW 181 (2001) (pointing out that 
“the colonist claimed to bring law from the outside, a civilized law of universal valency free from 
polluting involvement with the particularity of the local scene”).  In the context of humanitarian 
intervention, this can, of course, be counter-productive in numerous ways:  it appears (and may be) 
undemocratic, it may consequently lack validity and legitimacy, and it ignores the valid critiques 
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where the importation of a rationalized legal regime to protect human 
rights and the rule of law may actually undermine both—at least in 
process, and potentially, in effect.136 
The imposition of the new legal framework, and often its initial 
work, is managed by international administrators, bureaucrats, and 
experts.  In fact, the idea of expertise takes on particular significance in 
the context of the “field,” where location itself becomes partially 
constitutive of expertise.  The expert becomes the “international expert.”  
Early social theorist Georg Simmel first connected this question of 
“location” with the “distant” standpoint that is often embedded in 
notions of objectivity in expertise.  Simmel’s essay “The Stranger” 
explores the relationship of the stranger and the group and unearths an 
expertise in the standpoint of the stranger:  “[The stranger] is the freer 
man, practically and theoretically; he examines conditions with less 
prejudice; he assesses them against standards that are more general and 
more objective; and his actions are not confined to custom, piety, or 
precedent.”137  In part, expertise arises from the mobility and freedom of 
the stranger, which leads to different types of experiences and 
perspectives than those of the group. 
However, the stranger’s expertise is also grounded in a sort of 
objectivity, but this objectivity is not based solely on distance (as 
Weber’s “objectivity” may suggest), but rather upon a tension between 
distance from and embeddedness within the group.138  The stranger is 
involved with the group, and thus, may have a unique access to the facts 
as an outsider within the group.139  Yet the stranger also remains 
detached, with an objectivity that is not simply non-participation but 
reflects the lack of ties to the group that may “prejudice his perception, 
 
that have emerged about existing human rights law.  See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, 
Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:  
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 331, 348-53 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im & Francis M. Deng 
eds., 1990) (discussing the exclusion of non-western participants and perspectives in the early 
development of the international human rights regime); CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 8, 
at 36-37 (identifying a “Southern” critique of the “Western origins, orientation and cultural bias” of 
the international legal order). 
 136. Chandler, supra note 134, at 121. 
 137. Georg Simmel, The Stranger, in CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 4, at 
297. 
 138. The stranger’s objective attitude “does not signify mere detachment and nonparticipation, 
but is a distinct structure composed of remoteness and nearness, indifference and involvement.”  Id. 
at 296. 
 139. Simmel suggests that the stranger often has access to “revelations and confidences” from 
members of the group that are generally kept hidden.  Id. 
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his understanding, and his assessment of data.”140  There are risks, 
however, to the expert who operates both within and outside the group—
risks to the stranger and his or her ideas if they are identified as foreign 
or coming from outside.141 
This tension in expertise as a stranger, or outsider, doing 
transnational or international work, especially in the “field” has been 
further elaborated by contemporary theorists.  Critical geographer, 
Jennifer Hyndman, explains: 
Just as there is tension between discourses of universality and 
particularity—the shared language and entitlements of human rights 
versus distinguishing cultural practices—a discursive distance between 
“here” and “there,” “us” and “them,” confounds any singular 
understanding of culture.  “The field” is a diffuse and problematic term 
for . . . [those] who travel in a privileged way across cultures.  For 
some, “the field” is a place impossibly outside the power relations that 
organize “home.”142 
In fact, the relationships that develop or are constructed across 
those boundaries of home and field in transnational work often evolve 
into relations of “sub-citizens” and “supra-citizens.”143  This sense of 
citizenship reflects the hierarchy and status distinctions in international 
work, including consequences to mobility and authority within and 
across national borders.  The mobility and freedom of the “supra-
citizen,” like the mobility of the stranger, leads to different types of 
experiences and perspectives than those of the “sub-citizens.”  However, 
it also translates into broader—where you are comes to define who you 
are, as much as who you are defines where you are—in the asymmetrical 
relationships of “international” experts and “local” non-experts in the 
field.144 
 
 140. Id. at 297.  In fact, Simmel uses a type of legal expert to exemplify this objective 
standpoint—judges recruited from “outside” the community because they have no family or other 
entanglements.  Id. at 296.  For these experts, their “objective” expertise arises, in part, quite 
literally from distance. 
 141. Id. at 297 (Simmel calls these “dangerous possibilities”). 
 142. JENNIFER HYNDMAN, MANAGING DISPLACEMENT:  REFUGEES AND THE POLITICS OF 
HUMANITARIANISM 88-89 (Borderlines Ser. Vol. 16, 2000). 
 143. Id. at 110-11. 
 144. See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 119-20 (pointing out that “‘the international’ . . . becomes 
that which major powers wish to claim or own—peace, democracy, security, liberty—while “the 
local” becomes that for which major powers do not wish to take responsibility”); Alison Mountz, 
Embodying the Nation-State:  Canada’s Response to Human Smuggling, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 323, 
336 (2004).  See also Chandler, supra note 134, at 128; Upendra Baxi, Politics of Reading Human 
Rights, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 134, at 182-200. 
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Human rights work, particularly in the context of humanitarian 
intervention, raises similar and related questions of expertise, 
objectivity, and relationship.  In some sense, the whole idea of a field 
mission—and humanitarian intervention more generally—rests on the 
supposed objectivity of outside observers, strangers, and experts.  The 
international expert, like the stranger, is supposed to observe with less 
prejudice, with few ties to custom, using general and objective (in fact, 
universal) standards.  Yet experience suggests that such “international” 
experts are as grounded in their own locations, perspectives, interests, 
and customs as “local” others.145  As with law’s violence, closer 
interrogation of law’s bureaucracy and objective expertise complicates 
traditional understandings in ways that have significance for evaluating 
contemporary bureaucratic practices, including the everyday practices of 
international experts in humanitarian interventions.  They raise 
important questions of what the “rule of law” or the “international 
expert” offers in situations of conflict or transition and whether it is 
possible to imagine a more balanced engagement that reflects and 
appreciates both the embeddedness of the “objective” outsider and the 
expertise of the “subjects” of international interventions. 
IV.  TECHNIQUES OF LAW AND LAW AS TECHNIQUE:  HUMAN RIGHTS AS 
GOVERNANCE 
Although law’s originating and maintaining violence and law’s 
bureaucratic rationality are significant dimensions of its nature and 
work, in both domestic and international arenas, law’s reach extends 
beyond the confines of any particular legal system(s) or set of legal 
processes.  This section considers law as governance, as law expands its 
scope and transforms itself to discipline, shape, produce, and govern the 
members of society—local, national, or global—in countless ways.  This 
section will first discuss the contention that governance or 
“governmentality” has displaced more traditional forms of power in 
society and the consequences of that move for law.  It will then examine 
the practices and institutions of governance, including the recurring role 
 
 145. See CHANDLER, supra note 134, at 128.  Chandler identifies some of the inequities in the 
context of Bosnia:  “Internationals involved in the drawing up of laws are too often more focused on 
‘high salaries, low expenses and a “per-diem rich environment”’ resulting in bad laws.”  Id. (citing 
the Democratization Policy Institute).  See also BAXI, supra note 144.  Baxi notes that “[h]uman 
rights career bureaucrats/technocrats define their roles in ways that intermingle their positional 
advantage while pursuing the proliferation of human rights norms and standards.”  Id. at 194.  See 
also RAZACK, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing the prevalence of such attitudes in the Canadian 
peace-keeping mission in Somalia, but also in other humanitarian interventions around the globe). 
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of expertise.  Human rights and humanitarian intervention will be used 
to provide illustration that law as governance is not limited to the 
domestic context but also appears in international law. 
A. The Rise of Governmentality 
In his important and foundational essay “Governmentality,” Michel 
Foucault addresses the “problematic of government” and elaborates the 
idea of governmentality as a configuration of power.146  The rise of 
government occurs in the wake of the decline (or reconfiguration) of 
sovereignty, as historically understood.  Traditionally, sovereignty or 
sovereign power relied upon the law (backed by force) to achieve its 
aims—“law and sovereignty were absolutely inseparable.”147  With the 
emergence of government as a form of power, the relationship with law 
is transformed:  “[W]ith government it is a question not of imposing law 
on men but of disposing of things:  that is, of employing tactics rather 
than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics—to arrange 
things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such-and-
such ends may be achieved.”148  Law is no longer a simple manifestation 
of sovereign will, but rather one tool among many for the exercise of 
power. 
The idea of “governmentality” captures the sense that power 
achieves its objectives as it becomes internalized in practices of self-
government, within individuals or, more broadly, within societies.  In a 
general sense, “governmentality simply refers to any manner in which 
people think about, and put into practice, calculated plans for governing 
 
 146. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 229. 
 147. Id. at 237. 
 148. Id. In Foucault and Law:  Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance, Alan Hunt and 
Gary Wickham explain that Foucault often displaced the role of law in order to focus on other forms 
of power, and as a result, he did not directly engage with law itself at great length.  HUNT & 
WICKHAM, supra note 4.  In many ways, he limited the role of law by linking it to sovereign power 
and negative, “juridico-discursive” conceptions of power.  Id. at 40-43.  Nonetheless, they suggest 
that although “[l]aw is never one of his explicit objects of inquiry . . . he has a considerable amount 
to say about law.”  Id. at 39.  Hunt and Wickham find links to law in his major themes of power, 
discipline, and governmentality, among other areas.  In tracking the movement from sovereignty to 
disciplinary society, Foucault sets aside law to focus on the processes of discipline, and he presents 
law and discipline as “dual but opposing processes.”  Id. at 46.  Hunt and Wickham suggest that he 
also identifies the “interaction and interdependence of disciplinary practices and their legal 
framework.”  Id. at 47.  In this context, law is both constitutive of and a “mask of real power.”  Id. 
at 48.  Foucault’s displacement of law to focus on other forms of power (especially micro-power) 
also appears in his work on governmentality, where “he stresses the essentially non-legal character 
of his expanded conception of government.”  Id. at 52. 
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themselves.”149  More specifically, it is “a particular mode of deploying 
and reflecting upon power.”150  Neither sovereignty nor disciplinary 
practices are necessarily replaced by government, but rather a new 
dimension is added.  Foucault offers a triangular view of power as 
“sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the 
population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of 
security.”151 
While Weber considered the modern state dependent on 
bureaucracy, Foucault offers that it functions based upon the 
“dispositional and technocratic logic of governmentality.”152  With the 
“governmentalization” of the state, the sovereign authority, and even the 
law itself, has less and less significance.153  Instead, power is largely 
directed at the population through schemes of reform, pedagogy, and 
governance.  This results in “the formation of a whole series of specific 
governmental apparatuses, and . . . in the development of a whole 
complex of knowledges.”154  These governmental apparatuses and 
bodies of knowledge include the legal system and the law but also 
extend beyond the law to include projects of education, social work, and 
other efforts to manage or reform the population.  Law then becomes 
integrated into governance strategies to manage social problems and 
concerns.155 
Other theorists have questioned the idea that the move to 
governmentality necessarily results in a lesser significance or role for 
law in society.156  For example, Hunt and Wickham contend that law 
retains a prominent status even as power relations shift:  “[L]aw has 
been a primary agent of the advance of new modalities of power, [and] 
 
 149. BEN GOLDER & PETER FITZPATRICK, FOUCAULT’S LAW 31 (2009).  Golder and 
Fitzpatrick join other scholars in interrogating the relationship of law to Foucault’s theories of 
power.  They “locate Foucault’s law between a subordinated law and a surpassing law, between a 
law which is confined by the emerging modalities of disciplinary power and bio-power and one 
which is illimitable and always going beyond itself and those who would seek to instrumentalize it.”  
Id. at 39. 
 150. Id. at 31. 
151. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 243. 
 152. GOLDER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 149, at 32. 
 153. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 244. Foucault controversially asserts that the state “is no 
more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited 
than many of us think.”  Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. GOLDER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 149, at 33. 
 156. In their critique of Foucault’s work, Hunt and Wickham note that Foucault tends to focus 
on a narrow conception of law that centers on criminal law and ignores the multiple other sources 
and forms of law (which appears to be a common feature of sociological inquiries into law).  HUNT 
& WICKHAM, supra note 4, at 60. 
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law constitutes distinctive features of their mode of operation.”157  They 
suggest that Foucault’s theories of governmentality must be framed in 
dialogue with the work of Weber, among others; from that perspective, 
“all operations of law are instances of governance.”158  Governmentality 
and the rise of governance are, at least in part, “about the growth of 
modern government and the growth of modern bureaucracies.”159  In 
fact, these familiar bureaucratic institutions are where governmental 
power is exercised through a wide range of regulatory practices.  Public 
law, while not synonymous with governmentality, is always involved in 
either exercising control over or exempting from control the different 
projects of governance.160 
Although scholars may disagree about the extent to which law is 
displaced by the rise of governmentality, it is clear that its role changes 
as forms of power shift.  In a sense, the triangular model of power 
offered by Foucault of sovereignty-discipline-government is reflected in 
law’s multi-dimensional nature as violence-bureaucracy-governance and 
in the ways power is exercised through the courts, administrators, and 
civil society.161  Violence remains an important component of law—
connected to its origins, its preservation, and its enforcement—and 
bureaucracy retains its significance in the formal institutions and 
processes of the legal system itself.  Law as governmentality, however, 
captures another dimension.  In the modern state, law is pervasive; it 
extends its reach outside of the formal legal system to the encompassing 
and overlapping array of efforts to manage society.  In turn, those 
projects of governance also shape the content and scope of the law, 
domestically, and increasingly in the international realm as well. 
B. Doing the Work of Governance 
Government, like bureaucracy, is accomplished through the 
activities and practices of a wide range of specialized experts.  However, 
the power of government arises not from a static, all-powerful sovereign 
or state, but rather from “an assemblage of forces” organized into 
“mobile and loosely affiliated networks” that include both state officials 
 
 157. Id. at 65. 
 158. Id. at 99. 
 159. Id. at 76. 
 160. Id. at 66. 
 161. For example, Sarat suggests a Foucauldian understanding of “rival centers of power” in 
law where violence is tempered “within law’s complex chain of command.”  Sarat, supra note 34, at 
263. 
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and numerous other practitioners in the public and private spheres.162  
Governance occurs through the “assorted attempts at the calculated 
administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often 
competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, 
management, incitement, motivation and encouragement.”163  In this 
more indirect manifestation of power, it is the various “experts” who 
provide the links between political authorities and individuals; they 
ensure that “self-regulatory techniques can be installed in citizens that 
will align their personal choices with the ends of government.”164 
The task of expertise in governance is not one of “weaving an all-
pervasive web of ‘social control,’” but a more diffuse (though equally 
powerful) management of individuals as members of society.165  Law 
works in conjunction with expertise; it “translates aspects of a 
governmental programme into mechanisms that establish, constrain or 
empower certain agents or entities and set some of the key terms of their 
deliberations.”166  In a sense, law is meaningful in conferring expertise 
and shaping the confines of expert authority, both within and outside the 
legal system.  Law may be a specific tactic of government, but it also 
operates more broadly to contour the range of possibilities available to 
individuals, to experts, and even to the state.  This is evident in the 
familiar practices of the extended systems of justice, social work, public 
health, and so forth—that include networks of actors, legal and other 
experts, and official and unofficial participants. 
In a more exceptional but equally relevant context, law’s multi-
dimensionality—governance working together with violence and 
bureaucracy—appears in recent practices of detention, notably indefinite 
detention, in the “War on Terror.”167  Drawing upon Foucault and 
Agamben, Judith Butler elaborates the reemergence of sovereign power 
“within the field of governmentality.”168  In the environment of 
indefinite detention, law is used instrumentally as a tactic of 
 
 162. PETER MILLER & NIKOLAS ROSE, Political Power Beyond the State:  Problematics of 
Government, in GOVERNING THE PRESENT:  ADMINISTERING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL 
LIFE 53, 64 (2008). 
 163. Id. at 55.  Rose extends Foucault’s theory of governmentality and elaborates its 
connections to law.  He discusses the shifting nature of power in modern forms of government and 
the centrality of knowledge to governmental activities, first in the welfare state and then in the neo-
liberal state.  Id. 
 164. Id. at 69. 
 165. Id. at 55. 
 166. Id. at 70. 
 167. JUDITH BUTLER, Indefinite Detention, in PRECARIOUS LIFE:  THE POWERS OF MOURNING 
AND VIOLENCE 50, 50-100 (2004). 
 168. Id. at 53.  See AGAMBEN, supra note 54. 
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governmentality.169  Law is nominally suspended, both national law and 
international law, and a new exercise of sovereignty takes place outside 
the law through administrative bureaucracies.170  This sovereignty is 
linked to both governance and bureaucracy—“[p]etty sovereigns 
abound,” and these bureaucrats become “part of the apparatus of 
governmentality.”171 
Once again, the exceptional moment of the suspension of law 
reveals the convergence of different forms of power and the shifting role 
of law.172  Law is redefined; it is no longer “that to which the state is 
subject nor that which distinguishes between lawful state action and 
unlawful, but is now expressly understood as an instrument, an 
instrumentality of power, one that can be applied and suspended at 
will.”173  From the routine administrative tasks of the social welfare 
system to the exceptional circumstances of indefinite detention, theorists 
have begun to trace the essential dimensions of law as violence, 
bureaucracy, and governance.  A multi-dimensional perspective that 
accounts for this complexity enables a fuller understanding of the nature 
and operations of law in diverse settings—from the familiar to the 
extraordinary, and beyond the state to the international realm of 
humanitarian intervention. 
C. Projects of Governance in International Interventions 
Humanitarian interventions begin as the projects of states and inter-
governmental organizations but, like other projects of governance, 
expand to include a larger and more diffuse network of actors.  Because 
there is no global sovereign, international law has long struggled with 
 
 169. BUTLER, supra note 167, at 54. 
 170. Id. at 51. 
 171. Id. at 56, 59. 
 172. Butler contends that 
[t]he suspension of the rule of law allows for the convergence of governmentality and sovereignty; 
sovereignty is exercised in the act of suspension, but also in the self-allocation of legal prerogative; 
governmentality denotes an operation of administrative power that is extra-legal, even as it can and 
does return to law as a field of tactical operations. 
Id. at 55.  Butler notes that “contemporary forms of sovereignty exist in a structurally inverse 
relation to the rule of law, emerging precisely at that moment when the rule of law is suspended and 
withdrawn.”  Id. at 60 (emphasis in original). 
 173. Id. at 83.  In turn, sovereignty becomes “the variable application, contortion, and 
suspension of the law; it is, in its current form, a relation to law:  exploitative, instrumental, 
disdainful, preemptory, arbitrary.”  Id. 
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questions of power.174 In this milieu, a Foucauldian understanding of 
power is especially useful, where power is “employed and exercised in 
relations between people, rather than existing as a commodity that can 
be monopolized by a single entity,” such as the state or even an inter-
governmental organization like the United Nations.175  Instead, a 
defining feature of humanitarian intervention is that an “assemblage of 
actors” come together—nation-states, inter-governmental bodies, non-
governmental organizations, and individuals—to urge forceful 
intervention in the name of human rights and to manage the aftermath of 
that intervention.  International law is not just forceful or violent; it does 
not simply represent a return to the rational and objective rule of law.  It 
also serves as a form of pedagogy, a discipline, and a project of 
reform.176  Human rights, in particular, are often “pedagogically 
induced” through efforts to promote rights protection and (re)train the 
population.177 
In humanitarian intervention, the international community—
broadly defined—“constitutes itself in these texts of intervention and 
reconstruction as a designer of new worlds, a solver of problems, and a 
saviour of suffering peoples.”178  Humanitarian interventions have come 
to underpin the self-image of both the international community and 
(international) law “as a guarantor of peace, human rights and 
democracy.”179  From one perspective, it is possible to view 
humanitarian intervention and the importation of a human rights legal 
framework as a means to reform the nation (and its population) into an 
idealized, modern, even rationalized form of society.180  But if “human 
rights are a means to engage the social discourse in providing a shape 
 
 174. These include the enduring questions of “how to orient international law to power, or how 
best to deal with the realities of the operation of power in the international sphere.”  ORFORD, supra 
note 3, at 73. 
 175. Id. at 75. 
 176.  Id. at 54.  
 177. PHENG CHEAH, INHUMAN CONDITIONS:  ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 232 
(2006). 
 178. ORFORD, supra note 3, at 142.  Bauman uses a powerful metaphor of the “gardening” 
state, which “view[s] the society it rules as an object of designing, cultivating and weed-poisoning.”  
Although his focus is elsewhere, this is evocative of the rise of practices of discipline and 
governmentality in the modern state.  This suggests, once again, the linkages among the different 
facets of law.  BAUMAN, supra note 116, at 13. 
 179. ORFORD, supra note 3, at 19.  Along similar lines, Marchak suggests that the flaws of 
humanitarian intervention might be overcome by shifting involvement to a “disinterested” 
institution, such as an organization of experts.  MARCHAK, supra note 4, at 287. 
 180. LEONARD M. HAMMER, A FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
DESCRIPTIVE THOUGHTS FOR NORMATIVE ISSUES 72 (2007).  This also reflects the colonial history 
discussed earlier. 
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and context to society,” then the relationships of power and the actors 
multiply.181  Because of this diffusion of power, another perspective 
contends that human rights may also be used as a counter-hegemonic 
tool of social struggle.182  The role of law in such projects of governance 
is, thus, more ambivalent. 
For many advocates and activists, and many scholars, human rights 
work turns away from the (violent and bureaucratic) law and becomes a 
project and vision of ‘global civil society.’183  Hammer notes a trend in 
international law to reshape the human rights regime to a broadly 
defined human security regime, which more closely tracks Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality.  With a focus on human security, “the 
relationship with the sovereign state [alters] from one of function to that 
of transaction.”184  In this framework, “the area in which the human 
dwells is the focus, with the task falling on the government, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the populace at large 
to become active producers within the overall political system.”185  
Others have suggested that the turn away from law shifts the focus to 
broader notions of justice.186  For example, Kurasawa contends that the 
dominant legal framework of human rights is inadequate and obscures 
actual, emancipatory practices of justice.187  Instead, “struggle represents 
the core” of the enactment of human rights and global justice in the 
 
 181. Id. at 95.  The “dichotomous relationship between the sovereign state and the individual” 
that is foundational in human rights is displaced.  Id. at 90. 
 182. Id. at 93. 
 183. For many, ‘global civil society’ is embodied in the activists (and activism) “beyond 
borders” examined by Keck and Sikkink.  See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 10.  See also THE 
PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL, supra note 
183  (including a range of examples of human rights practices by both international and local 
activists and NGOs). 
 184. HAMMER, supra note 180, at 110. 
 185. Id. at 111. 
 186. For example, Nancy Fraser argues for an expanded notion of justice in the face of 
globalization and the changing nature and role of the nation state.  Nancy Fraser, Reframing Justice 
in a Globalizing World, NEW LEFT REVIEW 36, 1-19 (2005).  Justice in the globalizing world 
requires not only a redefinition of what constitutes justice, but also of who can make justice 
claims—“it is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame, which is in dispute.”  Id. at 4.  
Fraser suggests a new frame drawing upon the “all-affected principle.”  Id. at 13.  Under such a 
frame, “all those affected by a given social structure or institution have moral standing as subjects of 
justice in relation to it.”  Id.  She suggests that justice must now include “the political dimension of 
representation” so that justice is “parity of participation.”  Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).  The 
inclusion of a political dimension to justice raises questions of law—state jurisdiction and decision-
making rules, membership and procedure.  Id. at 6-7. 
 187. FUYUKI KURASAWA, THE WORK OF GLOBAL JUSTICE:  HUMAN RIGHTS AS PRACTICES 4 
(2007). 
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practices of global civil society, primarily outside traditional legal 
institutions.188 
Others are more skeptical about the increasing role of civil society 
and the emancipatory potential this transformation may represent.189  
When governmental and disciplinary technologies are increasingly 
deployed by a shifting combination of government and non-
governmental actors, the interests of civil society and the state may 
become more and more aligned.190  Civil society, then, becomes one 
more “domain for the articulation and formation of the people’s interests 
through governmental technologies.”191  This same process is at work at 
the international level.  Whether they are the benign force some imagine 
or more problematic, the organizations and networks of global civil 
society are significant in both the development and the implementation 
of international law, and especially human rights law.192  In 
 
 188. Id. at 15.  Kurasawa identifies these human rights practices as bearing witness, 
forgiveness, foresight, aid, and solidarity.  He acknowledges that some human rights practices do 
become institutionalized, such as the formal methods of bearing witness and forgiveness through 
international tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions.  Id. at 27, 56.  In addition, law may 
play a role in structuring the range and modes of practice available, but it is a limited one; law may 
determine criminal responsibility for injustice, but it has less to do with moral responsibility and 
political responsibility which are important aspects of global justice.  Id. at 76.  See also Elizabeth 
M. Bruch, Book Review:  The Work of Global Justice:  Human Rights as Practices (Fuyuki 
Kurasawa), 34 CAN. J. SOCIOLOGY, Winter 2009, at 207-09. 
 189. .  Foucault demonstrated some ambivalence in this regard.  In his statement, Confronting 
Governments:  Human Rights, Foucault seems to envision and even embrace an increasing role for 
“the community of the governed,” which obliges members to “show mutual solidarity.”  FOUCAULT, 
Confronting Governments:  Human Rights, in THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT:  SELECTIONS FROM 
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954-1984, supra note 4, at 64. However, in Truth and Juridical 
Forms, he also expresses some skepticism, at least historically, of the role of civil society actors as 
enforcers of disciplinary society.  FOUCAULT, supra note 126, at 60. 
 190. CHEAH, supra note 177, at 254. 
 191. Id. at 256. 
 192. HAMMER, supra note 180, at 121.  For example, it is common to distinguish within 
international law between “hard” law—binding forms of law such as treaties and custom—and 
“soft” law—non-binding authorities such as declarations, statements of principle, and guidelines.  
Jiri Toman, Quasi-Legal Standards and Guidelines for Protecting Human Rights, in GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 217, 217-43 (Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004).  Soft 
law is particularly prevalent in international human rights law, where advocates seek to develop it in 
hopes that it will ultimately achieve status as hard law.  In the interim, soft law serves as an 
expression of policy and ideals, recommendations and guidance for domestic governments.  In an 
interesting twist, law and the legal system have been the subjects of such guidance.  One of the first 
and most enduring examples of soft law is the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners adopted by the United Nations in 1957.  Id. at 217.  These guidelines “reflect the modern 
approach of reform-minded penologists who emphasize rehabilitation and restraint of a prisoner 
rather than retribution and deterrence.”  Id. at 221.  They also bear a striking resemblance in tone 
and content to the universal maxims cited by Foucault in Discipline and Punish:  The Birth of the 
Prison.  FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 269-70.  The international community has also adopted basic 
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humanitarian intervention, non-governmental organizations and other 
actors of global civil society work in partnership with governmental and 
inter-governmental authorities to monitor human rights violations, build 
local capacity, and transform the legal and regulatory landscape.  As 
such, they reflect “emerging forms of governmentality” that wield power 
through knowledge, information, advocacy, and expertise.193 
Whether in a framework of human rights or human security or 
justice, an approach centered on governance moves away from the state-
centric and law-centric approach that is traditional in international law 
and incorporates other actors, such as non-governmental organizations 
and the other actors of global civil society.  In humanitarian intervention, 
in the space created and maintained by violence, the international 
community also creates government as the “matrix within which are 
articulated all those dreams, schemes, strategies and manoeuvres of 
authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired 
directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances or their 
environment.”194 Through the activities of experts—in humanitarian 
intervention, that is “international” experts—it administers the local 
population “through countless, often competing, local tactics of 
education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation 
and encouragement.”195 
These tactics or techniques of governance include law, and often it 
is a dominant feature.  However, international efforts to establish “the 
rule of law” and protect human rights are also projects of reform and 
(re)education.196  Formal governmental, inter-governmental, and quasi-
governmental institutions manage and direct these projects, but they do 
not do so alone.  They work in cooperation or partnership with a vast 
network of civil society organizations that operate at all scalar levels, 
from the local to the global.  Not just the nation, but also the population, 
become subject to a project of reform and management in the name of 
human rights and the rule of law. 
 
guidelines delineating the appropriate roles for the judiciary, lawyers, and prosecutors and also for 
the treatment of victims.  Toman, supra, at 217-43. 
 193. CHEAH, supra note 177, at 126.  See also BAXI, supra note 144, at 191.  Baxi contends 
that despite the involvement of activists and civil society organizations, “national, regional, and 
global political, bureaucratic, and institutional actors . . . harness the prose of human rights to a 
whole variety of ends of governance.”  Id. 
 194. MILLER & ROSE, supra note 162, at 54. 
 195. Id. at 55. 
 196. CHEAH, supra note 177, at 230-67; ORFORD, supra note 3. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Law has a particular set of meanings to those who are trained in it 
or who work directly with it.  However, because it extends its reach 
throughout the social world, there is much to be learned from other 
theorists who have investigated law.  In some ways, law is everywhere 
in everyday life; it touches quotidian interactions at home, in school, and 
at work.  At the same time, or perhaps as a result, law appears directly 
tied to particular communities—often local, at most national.  Its 
pervasiveness and embeddedness can render it opaque, if not invisible.  
Sometimes a direct encounter with the law—a criminal trial, a broken 
contract, a contested divorce—provides a rare opportunity to experience 
how law works.  Other times it is a challenge—That’s not the law!  Is 
that the law?—that prompts closer examination.  Such is the case with 
international law.  Fundamental questions, such as whether international 
law is really law at all, encourage deeper inquiry into what it means to 
be law. 
Theorists from a range of disciplines have engaged in a searching 
examination of what law is and how it works.  Drawing upon these 
contributions, a multi-dimensional view of law—including international 
law—emerges.  Law is enmeshed with violence and force, with 
bureaucracy and rationality, and with governance and reform.  If that is 
law’s nature, then international law is indeed law.  However, even as 
law’s multi-dimensionality responds to one major question, it raises 
new, and perhaps more difficult, questions.  If law exists in relationship 
with violence, what are the consequences of that relationship?  In 
particular, what are the consequences for international human rights 
law?  What opportunities would law disconnected from violence offer 
(or foreclose)?  But violence is not the only aspect of law; law is also 
rational and bureaucratic.  Questions arise here as well.  What are the 
broader implications and human costs of this form of organization and 
the increasing rationalization of law?  What lessons can be drawn from 
(and for) the growing bureaucracy of the United Nations and the human 
rights framework?  How do we evaluate expertise as an instrument of 
authority?  Finally, law is increasingly entwined with governance.  How 
are law and governmentality implicated in one another?  Is law displaced 
by governance or has it extended its reach beyond the formal institutions 
of the legal system?  What are the consequences of the increasing power 
of civil society, especially at the global level? 
These are important questions, questions that are not easy to answer 
but that provide a map for future inquiries.  Humanitarian intervention 
offers a powerful and revealing current example of law-making and law-
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preserving violence as well as the processes of bureaucratization in post-
conflict areas.  Related human rights endeavors, especially in post-
conflict nation-building contexts, illustrate the pervasiveness of 
governmentality and the ways in which it affects power relations at the 
global level.  With on-going international interventions occurring around 
the globe, it is important to seriously consider these larger questions.  
Closer examination of law’s multi-dimensional nature provides a means 
for doing so. 
  

